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POISON PILLS: IS THE FLIP-IN FLIPPING OUT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last fifteen years, battles' for corporate control have been
"[w]aged with the intensity of military campaigns and the weaponry of
seemingly bottomless bankrolls." 2 Contests for control have led to the
development by corporate management of new, complex and ingenious
defensive tactics.' From the continuing development of defensive strategies' to thwart hostile tender offers, there has evolved a unique, control. The battle is joined when a bidder initiates a tender offer. Although the definition of a
tender offer has been elusive, the tender offer process begins when a target corporation's shareholders are publicly invited or solicited to sell their shares to the bidder for cash or securities.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 531-34 (1986); see Wurczinger, Toward a Definition of "Tender Offer," 19 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 191 (1982); Symposium, The Elusive Definition of a Tender Offer, 7
J. CORP. L. 503 (1982). Courts are conservative in deciding what constitutes a tender offer, but
invariably will conclude an activity constitutes a tender offer when "large-scale purchase programs
[are] accompanied by active and widespread solicitation or pressure on shareholders to accept or
reject the offer quickly." Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisalof Current Regulation of Mergers
and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 663 (1984) (footnote omitted).
2. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984).
3. See Reisner, Corporate Takeovers: A Glossary of Terms and Tactics, CASE & COM.,
Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 35.
4. These defensive tactics fall into two categories: financial and structural. Financial defenses, usually adopted by the board in response to a takeover bid, are designed to reduce the
attractiveness of the target to a bidder. A structural defense, implemented to make changes in
control more difficult, is placed in the bylaws or charter before the initiation of a tender offer. See
Green & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 701-06; Comment, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and the Poison
Pill: The Propriety of a Patent Takeover Defense, 17 PAC. L.J. 890, 899-905 (1986). A variety of
financial defenses to corporate takeovers are available to the board of directors of the target company. One extreme action is known as the "scorched earth" defense where management may
decide to liquidate the company in whole or in part. See, e.g., Joseph Seagram & Sons v. Abrams,
510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Another option, known as the "Crown Jewel" sale, is to sell
an attractive subsidiary or asset to a friendly suitor. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537
F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The board of directors may also choose to launch a tender offer
for the stock of the bidder which is referred to as the "Pac-Man" defense. See, e.g., Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982). As with financial defenses,
there are a variety of structural responses available to target management. First, the board may
adopt a "staggered board" terms strategy. The terms of directors expire at different times which
requires at least two successive annual meetings to elect a majority of the board. Another option
available is that the board of directors can recommend to shareholders that a "supermajority
provision" be added to the charter. This provision requires that more than the minimum vote
required by law (usually a majority of two-thirds) be obtained to approve any merger or sale of
the corporation. See Green & Junewicz, supra note 1, at 703. Fair-price provisions "which set[]
forth pricing and procedural requirements for the purchase of shares" are another option to management. Id. (footnotes omitted). Other defenses include white knights, cyanide capsules, golden
parachutes, and corporate suicide. For a full discussion of these defenses, see generally CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW § 13.6 (1988); A. FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND
PLANNING (1983);
WINTER,
STUMPF
& HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLANTS AND GOLDEN
PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER § 1.1 (1986); Finkestein, Antitakeover ProPublished by eCommons, 1988
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versial tactic known as the poison pill. 5 The poison pill is one of the

most innovative, confusing and now popular defensive weapons
designed to avert a hostile takeover. "[I]ts very complexity is designed
to create uncertainty on the part of a potential acquiror."'
In general, poison pills are issued when the target's board creates a
new class of preferred stock and distributes shares of the new preferred
stock to the common stock shareholders as a dividend.7 The preferred
stock will contain either conversion 8 or redemption 9 privileges, which
are not exercisable until the occurrence of a specified "triggering
event." 10 Another method of implementing a poison pill involves giving
the target company's common shareholders, as a dividend, rights or
warrants, instead of preferred stock." The rights issued as a dividend
are also restricted to certain triggering events. 2 The poison pill rights
plan generally will exclude the acquiror from exercising such rights; if
the rights are exercised, they will have a highly dilutive effect on the
acquiror's interest.' 3 The rights may be redeemed by the target company's board for nominal consideration. Thus, bids approved by management, whether friendly or hostile, are not foreclosed by the poison
pill rights plan."
Since poison pill plans have been introduced, 1 5 courts have strug-

tection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid.
and Flip-Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, II SEC. REG. L.J. 291 (1984); Weiss, Defensive
Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibitions Against Manipulation, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
5. The moniker refers to the sting or poison that the bidder must swallow to complete the
acquisition which may cause severe economic repercussions. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 574-75.
6. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), affd, 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985).
7. CLARK, supra note I, at 574-75.
8. The holder of the preferred stock would be able to convert the stock into voting stock of
the acquiror. Id. at 574.
9. The redemption privilege allows the preferred stockholder to redeem these preferred
shares for a substantial price. Id. at 575.
10. Dawson, Pence & Stone, Poison Pills Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. LAw. 423 (1987).
The "triggering event" occurs when an acquiror accumulates a certain percentage of the target's
common stock. Id. This percentage is usually set at 20 to 30% of outstanding common shares.
I1. CLARK, supra note 1, at 575. "The holder of the right would be entitled to buy new
preferred stock on certain terms," for example, $200 worth of the acquiring company's equity for
$100. Id.
12. These triggering events are usually the same as with poison pill preferred stock. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
13. CLARK, supra note 1, at 574.
14. Note, Poison Pill Rights: Toward A Two-Step Analysis of Directors' Fidelity to Their
Fiduciary Duties, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 375 (1988).
15. Lenox, Inc. first used a poison pill plan in response to a tender offer by Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. The Lenox board rejected the offer as inadequate and declared a dividend on
Lenox's common shares which contained characteristics of a poison pill. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Lenox, Inc., No. 83-2116 (D.N.J. June 20, 1983); see also Wall St. J., June 16,
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gled to develop an acceptable and consistent test for determining the
validity of these techniques designed to avert corporate takeovers. Some
courts have protected and encouraged the use of some poison pill plans
by applying the business judgment rule. 6 Other courts have invalidated
poison pills by considering the effect of the plans on basic stockholder
rights 7 or on the statutory distribution of power within the corporation."8 These courts have applied anti-discrimination statutes to invalidate certain poison pill plans.' 9
This comment begins with an examination of the general characteristics of the poison pill, in particular, the so called "flip-in''2 provision included in some plans. This comment will then provide a background of and analyze the important cases interpreting the validity of
the poison pill and the struggle by various courts to define a workable
test to guide this emerging area of the law. The business judgment rule,
as applied to poison pills, and traditional reluctance of courts to interfere in the corporate boardroom will also be discussed. The emerging
trend by courts to scrutinize the mechanisms adopted by boards of directors will then be examined. Finally, this comment will contend that
the business judgment rule should be merely the first step in a poison
pill analysis and that courts must look further and determine the effects
of the poison pill, which may impinge upon basic shareholder rights.
II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POISON PILL

The primary purpose of a poison pill provision is to alleviate the
element of coercion which has been associated with tender offers. 2 ' In
1983, at 2, col. 2. See generally Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The "Poison Pill" as a
Takeover Defense. II J. CORP. L. 25 (1985).
16. The business judgment rule has been defined in court decisions. "It is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see KNEPPER & BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 179-207 (1988). However, the business judgment rule has been
modified in the takeover context. See infra notes 46-86 and accompanying text.
17. Some forms of poison pill plans will have a dilutory effect on voting rights and equity on
particular shareholders (i.e. acquiror) as well as those common shareholders who have transferred
or failed to exercise their rights under a poison pill plan. See infra notes 87-123 and accompanying text.
18. The very nature of poison pill plans may put the decision of whether to sell the corporation in the hands of the board of directors instead of the shareholders (owners). See infra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
21. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 113 (1979). Lipton points out that in almost every tender offer in the past five years, the holders of the majority of
the shares will tender. "[The special dynamics of a tender offer are such that the decision of
shareholders is almost always a foregone conclusion-they will tender, therefore, it is misleading to
speak of a free shareholder choice at all." Id.
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recent years partial22 and two-tiered23 tender offers have exacerbated
the coercive nature of the tender offer process. The shareholder who
does not accept the tender offer finds himself, in both situations, in an
inferior position.2 4 In the partial tender offer, the shareholder will become a minority shareholder subject to the abuses of the acquiror. The
shareholder who refuses the two-tiered tender offer will find himself
"squeezed out" by being forced to accept a lower buyout price than the
tendering shareholders.25
Since the first poison pill, five basic provisions have evolved that
are generally attached to or contained within the preferred stock or
rights.2 6 First, the flip-over provision permits stock rights holders of the
target corporation to purchase stock in the acquiring corporation at a
cost substantially below market price after the acquisition. 7 A second
feature, the backend provision, allows the target corporation's stockholders to receive stock and/or debt of the target and/or cash, usually
at a premium over the market price of the target's stock. 8 Third, convertible preferred stock provisions permit stockholders of the target corporation to convert their shares in the target into voting shares of the
acquiror. If this combination does not occur, stockholders are given the
power to redeem their preferred stock for cash payments from the target.2" A fourth feature of a typical poison pill entails a voting provision
which confers upon the target shareholders superior voting rights to
those of the acquiror.3 0
The focus of this comment will be on the final feature of poison

22. A partial tender offer occurs when the bidder acquires a bare majority in the target with
no intention of any second step to acquire the remaining shares. CLARK, supra note I, at 545; see
also Comment, Delaware'sAttempt to Swallow a New Take-Over Defense: The Poison Pill Preferred Stock, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 569, 572-73 (1985).
23. See Minvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485 (1983). A two-tiered tender offer is "a partial tender offer . . . coupled
with an announced plan to follow up with a second-step merger at a lower price per share." Id.;
see also Comment, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and the Poison Pill: The Propriety of a Potent
Takeover Defense, 17 PAC. L.J. 890 (1986).
24. See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The
"Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1966 (1985).

25. Comment, supra note 22, at 571-72.
26. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
27. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 10, at 426-28.
28. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 10, at 428-29; see, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes v.
Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.), aff'd mem., 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1985).
29. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 10, at 429-30; see, e.g.. Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. Lenox, Inc., No. 83-2116 (D.N.J. June 20, 1983). The Lenox plan implemented this type
of pill. Id.
30. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 10, at 430. These super voting privileges are limited to specified circumstances for the purported purpose of severely diluting the voting power of
the bidder seeking control. Id.; see, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp.
1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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pill plans, the flip-in provision.3 1 Flip-in provisions allow target common
shareholders, except the acquiror,.to purchase stock and/or debt of the
target corporation at bargain prices.32 This tactic has the effect of diluting an acquiror's investment in the target company and may prevent
the acquiror from purchasing a substantial block of the target's stock
on the open market.3 3
Courts have struggled to articulate a viable test to determine the
validity of poison pill plans. The early cases applied the business judgment rule to the decision of the board of directors to implement the
plan. 3" Commentators who have supported the business judgment rule
test 35 assert that a takeover bid is just another major business decision. 36 Conversely, other commentators37 assert that responding to a
tender offer is a prerogative of the shareholder, and as such, a rule of
managerial passivity38 should be imposed. 39

III. COURT DECISIONS
The common thread in poison pill cases appears to be the confusion and uncertainty created by the dynamic nature of poison pill plans.
31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32. Id.
33. The flip-in, when triggered, allows each right holder, except the acquiring shareholder,
to purchase additional shares in the target thereby diluting the acquiring shareholder's equity in
the target and preventing the purchase of a substantial block of shares in the open market. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 10, at 428.
34. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.-Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 21, at 101. "[So long as the directors act in good faith and
on a reasonable basis, their decision to accept or reject a takeover bid should not be subject to
being second guessed." Id. at 121. "Once the directors have properly determined that a takeover
should be rejected they may take any reasonable action to accomplish this purpose .
Id. at
123.
36. See, e.g., Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. III. 1969).
"[Mianagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detrimental
to the company or its stockholders ....
After [making a carefully considered decision], the company may then take any step not forbidden by law to counter the attempted capture." Id. at
712-13.
37. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
38. Id. at 1194-1204. The Management Passivity Rule imposes on the board of directors a
complete prohibition of all defensive measures. See CLARK, supra note 1, at 580-82 (five possible
rules that could be employed to govern the behavior of target company directors in the takeover
context).
39. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 37, at 1194-1204. Replacement of existing management is a frequent occurrence in a successful takeover.
Given the serious and unavoidable conflict of interest that inheres in any decision on one's
own ouster, courts ought not to make available to a manager resisting a tender offer-and,
in effect, fighting against his own replacement-the same deference accorded to the decisions of a manager in good standing.
Id. at 1198.
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However, two distinct trends by courts have emerged in the analysis of
takeover defense strategies.4 The first judicial approach applies the
business judgment rule, as developed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co." and refined in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp."'
The second analytical approach taken by courts incorporates the business judgment rule, but also considers incumbent management's poison
pill as an equally crucial focal point. Courts that have adopted the second approach have invalidated the defensive tactics designed to avert
takeovers, holding that their creation violates anti-discrimination
statutes.43
A.

Business Judgment Rule

In Unocal, the Unocal board of directors adopted a "self-tender '" 4"
defensive strategy to deter a two-tiered, front loaded4 5 tender offer initiated by Mesa Petroleum, a 13 % minority shareholder of Unocal.46
The self tender was extended to all common stock shareholders of Unocal, except Mesa.4 7
The Supreme Court of Delaware examined Unocal's self tender
offer and recognized "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests. ' 48 To prevent the lure of self-preservation, the Unocal court modified the business judgment rule by announcing "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred.1 49 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the board of directors has the initial burden of showing
that it had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed.15 0 The board of directors could overcome its burden "'by showing good faith and reasonable investiga-

40. See infra notes 43-120 and accompanying text.
41. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
42. 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
43. qee infra notes 77-117 and accompanying text.
44. 493 A.2d at 950. Unocal's self-tender offer involved Unocal purchasing its own stock
with a price of $72 per share. Id. at 951.
45. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 10, at 428; see, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. I11.
1986) (upheld a poison pill with a flip-in provision). But
see Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. N.L. Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (invalidating the
flip-in provision).
46. Unocal. 493 A.2d at 949.
47. Id. at 951.
48. Id. at 954. "From this it is now well established that in the acquisition of its shares a
Delaware corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not
acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office." Id. at 953-54.
49. Id. at 954.
50. Id. at 955.
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tion.' "51 The Unocal court reasoned that, once the board's burden is
satisfied, the burden shifts to the plaintiff challenging the board action
to prove a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors. 2
Thus, unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating themselves in
office or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching,
lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board. 53
Moreover, the Unocal court held that a board's response to a takeover
attempt is an ordinary business decision. However, the Delaware Supreme Court did not address the discriminatory exclusion of Mesa, a
common shareholder of Unocal. 4
The version of the modified business judgment rule set forth in
Unocal was applied by the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v.
Household International, Inc.55 Faced with the possibility of a "bustup"" takeover attempt, the Household International board of directors
adopted a poison pill containing a flip-over5 7 provision solely as a preventive measure and not in response to an actual tender offer." Moran,
Household's largest single shareholder, contended that the board of directors was not authorized to adopt the poison pill plan.5 9
Concluding that the adoption of the poison pill plan was within the
authority of the board of directors,"0 the Moran court validated the
flip-over provision by applying the same business judgment rule that it
had adopted in Unocal."1
The Delaware Supreme Court also responded to Moran's contention that the poison pill would result in "a fundamental transfer of
power from the stockholders to the directors." 62 In so doing, the Moran

51. Id. (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964)).
52. Id. at 958.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 958-59.
55. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
56. Id. at 1349. A " 'bust-up' takeover ... refers to a situation in which one seeks to finance
an acquisition by selling off pieces of the acquired company." Id. at 1349 n.4.
57. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The flip-over provision adopted by Household permitted its common shareholders to buy $200 of stock of the acquiring company for $100.
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
58. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
59. Id. 'at 1351.
60. Id. at 1355.
61. Id. "The 'directors must show [initially] that they had reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy . . . existed ....
' Id. at 1356 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)). Only after this burden is met would the court
apply the protections of the BJR. Id.
62. Id. at 1354.
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court examined the effects the takeover defense would have on the
corporation:
The Rights Plan will result in no more of a structural change than any
other defensive mechanism adopted by a board of directors. The Rights
Plan does not destroy the assets of the corporation. The implementation
of the Plan neither results in any outflow of money from the corporation
nor impairs its financial flexibility. It does not dilute earnings per share.
S.,. Comparing the Rights Plan with other defensive mechanisms, it does
less harm to the value structure . . . than do other mechanisms."
An important factor for the Moran court was that the flip-over
provision instituted by the board of Household International did not
dilute earnings per share and did not adversely affect market price."
The court noted very significant distinctions between the flip-over and
the flip-in provisions of poison pill plans.6 5 Therefore, the question for
the Moran court became whether the same approach should be applied
when considering the validity of all poison pill plans, particularly when
the differences among pill plans and their varied effects on the corporate shareholders are considered.
The modified business judgment rule test developed in Unocal and
Moran was also adopted by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp."6 When
Dynamics made a tender offer to acquire a 27.5 % interest in CTS, the
board of directors of CTS adopted a back-end rights plan.6 7 The plan
gave all common shareholders, except Dynamics, the right to turn in
their shares and receive a $50 bond payable in any year. 8 The litigation that ensued involved a challenge based upon section 23-1-25-1(a)
of the Indiana Code 9 which requires all shares of a class of stock to
have preferences, limitations and relative rights identical to those of
other shares of the same class of stock.70 The district court upheld the
validity of the rights plan, 71 finding that the decision of the board to
take defensive measures to avert a takeover must be afforded the protection of the business judgment rule."

63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. While a flip-over provision does not dilute earnings per share, a flip-in provision will
have this effect on the acquiring shareholder who is excluded from the rights plans. See supra note
32 and accompanying text.
66. 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. II. 1986).
67. Id. at 1176-77.
68. Id. at 1177.
69. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-25-1(a) (West 1989).
70. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 1986).
71. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. at 1181.
72. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d at 705.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the CTS Corp.
case for further inquiry as to whether the rights plan was adopted in
good faith and pursuant to a reasonable investigation." Writing for the
court, Judge Posner also reasoned that the rights plan adopted by the
CTS board did not run afoul of section 23-1-25-1(a), the Indiana antidiscrimination statute.7 ' The court found that, "[ajlthough Dynamics'
[anti-discrimination] argument, is consistent with the language of the
statute .... [t]he Indiana Code forbids discrimination between shares
but is silent on discrimination between shareholders." 15 To resolve the
issue, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Delaware law,
which allows discrimination between shareholders in certain
7
circumstances. 1
In his decision, Judge Posner reasoned that, if Dynamics' discrimination argument was accepted it would mean that the Indiana Legislature had "unwittingly facilitated takeovers by outlawing poison pills. ' '77
Since the statute was designed to deter takeovers,78 the appellate court
followed the reasoning of Delaware law and allowed discrimination between shareholders.7 9 However, Judge Posner stated that a different result might be reached if the poison pill singled out and discriminated
against Dynamics alone; the CTS poison pill affected any shareholder
who acquired a 28% interest or more in the corporation.8 0
The decisions discussed above have applied and developed the
modified business judgment rule. 8' Is the modified business judgment
rule standard applicable to a flip-in provision that dilutes voting power
and equity? Should flip-in poision pill provisions be judged by the business judgment rule or should the discriminatory effects of these tactics
designed to avert hostile takeovers be an equally critical focal point? A
judicial trend has emerged that not only scrutinizes the actions of the
board of directors of the target corporation in a takeover situation, but
also examines the effect the poison pill has on shareholders.

73. Id. at 709.
74. Id. at 718; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-25-1(a) (West 1989) (all shares of a class must
have preferences, limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other shares of the same
class).
75. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d at 718 (citations omitted).
76. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977) (distinguished between discrimination among shares and discrimination among shareholders and permitted shareholder discrimination ifthe discrimination resulted from a defensive measure in response to a
hostile takeover).
77. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d at 718.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 39-75 and accompanying text.
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An Emerging Trend

A trend has emerged whereby the judiciary will not only scrutinize
the board of director's actions in implementing poison pill plans and
the protections afforded by the modified business judgment rule, but
also will examine the effect on shareholders of the flip-in provision of
poison pill plans as well as any conflict between the flip-in provision
and anti-discrimination statutes.
In Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries,8 2 the District Court
for the Southern District of New York enjoined the implementation 8of3
a poison pill plan adopted by the NL Industries board of directors.
Without applying the business judgment rule,84 the court ruled that the
rights plan adopted by the board of directors, which utilized a flip-in
provision that diluted the voting rights and equity of the acquiring
shareholder, was ultra vires under a New Jersey law proscribing discrimination among shareholders of the same class or series.8 5 After an
earlier takeover attempt the board of directors of NL Industries, fearing the possibility of another takeover threat, adopted a rights plan that
contained a flip-in as well as a flip-over provision. 8 The flip-in provision provided that after a certain "triggering event ' '87 all rights holders
would be entitled to purchase $100 of NL Industries stock for $50.88
Under the plan, the acquiring shareholder would not have any such
rights.
Amalgamated Sugar proposed a full cash tender offer to the board
of directors of NL Industries on the condition that all rights under the
rights plan be redeemed.8 " The board refused, stating that "the inherent value of the company's component businesses is significantly
greater than the price proposed." 90 Amalgamated brought suit to enjoin the rights plan, arguing that the plan violated New Jersey's antidiscrimination statute.9"

82. 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
83. Id. at 1240.
84. Id. at 1230. The actions of the board of NL Industries were not before the court. The
only issue to be decided was whether the adoption of the rights plan by the directors of NL
Industries was ultra vires. Id.
85. Id. at 1234.
86. Id. at 1231-32.
87. Id. at 1232. Under the rights plan the flip-in provision would be triggered by the announcement that a shareholder owned 20% or more of NL Industries common stock. The flip-over
provision likewise would be triggered if a tender offer for 30% or more of NL Industries stock was
initiated. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1233.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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The district court ruled that the flip-in provision of the rights plan,
when implemented, would discriminate among shareholders of the
same class or series in violation of New Jersey's anti-discrimination
statute.9 2 The NL Industries court found that the flip-in provision effected a dilution of the voting rights and equity of the acquiring shareholder. 3 "It is a dilution that affects voting power and it is a dilution
94
that affects equity."
The NL Industries court predicated the injunction on the diluting
effects to voting power and equity to the acquiring shareholders of the
target corporation. When the rights plan is triggered "there suddenly
exist votes that did not exist before which have the effect *ofupsetting
normal corporate structure." 5 Further, the court found that the flip-in
provision subjects an acquiring person's equity to discriminatory
dilution. 96
The NL Industries court also examined the discriminatory effect
of the plan if the rights under the plan were issued as dividends to all
shareholders. 97 "It is axiomatic under the laws of New Jersey, and
most other jurisdictions, that dividends paid to shareholders of a class
must be the same to each shareholder." 98 Under the rights plan, a 20%
shareholder and all other shareholders would receive a dividend. 99
However, District Judge Broderick found that, "[olnce there is a second trigger what they received changes in value according to whom the
shareholder is. I do not believe that this is permissible."100 Judge Broderick noted that the rights certificates "in the hands of the acquirer
differ from those in the hands of all other shareholders."1 01
The district court in NL Industries relied heavily upon the Moran
decision.10 2 The Moran court's validation of the particular pill in question was predicated on the fact that the rights plan did not dilute voting power or equity, and did not alter the corporate structure any more

92. Id. at 1234.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. If the triggering event occurred when NL stock was trading at $12.50 per share,
the rights would entitle each shareholder except Amalgamated to purchase eight additional common shares. Id. at 1233.
96. Id. If, for example, an "acquirer had paid $450,000,000 for 60 percent of the outstanding common shares of NLI, the triggering flip-in provision would reduce the acquirer's equity to
$279,000,000." Id.
97. Id. at 1236.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1237; see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text. The Moran court validated
a flip-over provision. 644 F. Supp. at 1237.
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than other defensive mechanisms.10 3 This rights plan, Judge Broderick
noted, certainly diluted earnings per share and voting, and had an effect on corporate structure as to make it completely safe from tender
offer for ten years." 4 The NL Industries court ultimately granted the
preliminary injunction against the implementation of the poison pill
rights plan passed by the board.10 5
In a more recent case, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin examined the modified business judgment rule and the anti-discrimination argument in the takeover context. In R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway,'06 the board of directors of
Preway adopted a rights plan with a flip-in provision which was intended to make it difficult to acquire control of the corporation. 07 The
rights plan was adopted in response to the filing by R.D. Smith & Co.
of a schedule 13 G statement with the SEC.'08 The schedule disclosed
that R.D. Smith had acquired a 15% minority interest in Preway. 0 9
The flip-in provision was triggered when an acquiring shareholder obtained a 25% or more interest in Preway. 110
R.D. Smith & Co. sought a preliminary injunction against
Preway's poison pill plan, claiming that (1) Preway's board of directors
breached its fiduciary duty to shareholders in adopting the plan, and
(2) the poison pill plan violated the Wisconsin statute prohibiting discrimination among shareholders."' The district court denied the preliminary injunction of Preway's poison pill plan. Though it found R.D.
Smith & Co. would be able to succeed on the merits of its claim, it was
unable to show irreparable harm."'
The Preway court, however, applied the same modified business
judgment rule as first set forth in Unocal 3 and later refined in Moran."4 If the protections of the modified business judgment rule are to

103. 644 F. Supp. at 1239.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1240.
106. 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
107. Id. at 870. The rights plan contained a flip-over provision as well. Id. at 871.
108. Id. at 870. The SEC requires this schedule when a shareholder acquires 10% or more
of a corporation.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 871. The flip-over provision was triggered when a tender offer was received for
30% or more of the voting shares. Id.
I 1l. Id. at 869; see WIs. STAT. § 180.12(3) (Supp. 1989) ("All shares of the same class
shall be identical .... "). This statute is very similar to the New Jersey statute discussed in the
NL Industries case. 644 F. Supp. at 1237.
112. 644 F. Supp. at 878. In order for the district court to order a preliminary injunction, a
moving party must prove three things: (I) no adequate remedy at law; (2) a danger of irreparable
harm; and (3) the likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 871.
113. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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be given to the board, the process by which the directors adopted the
rights plan must be examined.1 15 The Preway court relied heavily upon
the CTS Corp." 6 decision in determining the legal standard governing
a corporate board of directors which adopts a defensive mechanism in
response to a takeover threat." 7 The court ruled that Preway's adoption of the poison pill was merely perfunctory; therefore, Preway was
unable to meet the good faith and reasonable investigation
requirement."'
The Preway court also discussed the anti-discrimination argument
presented in NL Industries." 9 The district court stated that the New
Jersey statute at issue in NL Industries was similar to the Wisconsin
anti-discrimination statute.2 0 Section 180.12(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes 2' permits differences in voting rights between different classes or
series of stock, but does not allow discrimination among shareholders of
the same class and series. 2 The district court found Preway's plan,
like NL Industries' plan, was discriminatory, particulary since the flipin provision diluted the acquiring shareholder's voting power and equity. 12 3 The Preway court was also concerned, like the NL Industries
court, that the issuance of the rights in the form of a dividend was a
separate source of unlawful discrimination against a 20% or more
shareholder.' 2 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

A viable test has finally been developed to determine the validity
of the ever changing, ever complex poison pill plans. The analysis developed in R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway 5 is a two-part test involving
the modified business judgment rule, as developed in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.' and Moran v. Household International,Inc., 2 7

115. Preway, 644 F. Supp. at 875.
116. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
117. Preway, 644 F. Supp. at 876. The directors had to prove that they adopted the plan in
good faith and with reasonable investigation and "show that the defensive mechanism was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Once the directors satisfy this burden . . . their actions are
entitled to the presumptions of the business judgment rule .... " Id. at 876 (quoting Dynamics
Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).
118. Id. at 877.
119. See supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
120. Preway, 644 F. Supp. at 873; see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
121. WIs. STAT. § 180.12(3) (Supp. 1989).
122. 644 F. Supp. at 873-74.
123. Id. at 873.
124. Id. at 874. This form of discrimination involves the issuance of dividends with the flipin rights attached to all shareholders except the acquiring shareholder.
125. 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
126. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
127. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).

Published by eCommons, 1988

714

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:3

but goes even further and examines the effects the poison pill plan has
on all shareholders. Under the Preway analysis, the poison pill cannot
violate anti-discrimination statutes as it relates to the rights between
shareholders and shares.
The Preway decision clearly signals that courts will closely scrutinize poison pill plans to ensure protection for all shareholders while, at
the same time, affording the board of directors some protection from
hostile takeovers.
J. Kurt Denkewalter
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